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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to examine the Wagner’s law validity, and whether 
it can explain the U.K. public spending expansion for the period 1850-2010. According to 
Wagner’s Law, economic development is the key determinant to public sector growth. 
Accordingly, the public sector grows overproportionally compared to national income when 
economies develop. We test this hypothesis for the UK. The data covers a period in which 
the U.K. economy experienced increased economic growth, government spending and met 
most of the assumption of Wagner’s Law (industrialisation, urbanisation, increased 
population). Furthermore, the long data set ensures the reliability of our results in terms of 
statistical and economic conclusions. We apply unit root tests, unit root tests with structural 
breaks, cointegration techniques and the Granger causality test. Our results indicate a 
presence of a long run relationship between national income and government spending, 
while the causality is bi-directional, thus we find support for Wagner’s and Keynesian 
hypotheses. 
Keywords: Wagner’s Law, long time series, public finance, applied econometrics, 
economic development 
1 Introduction 
Adolph Wagner (1835-1917) was a German economist who supported a state welfare system 
in opposition to a socialist welfare state. Wagner was also a member of the Prussian 
parliament from 1882-1885 and the Prussian House of Lords from 1910 onwards. Wagner 
actively supported the monarchy against any (social) democratic movement. In this sense 
Wagner was a supporter of a kind of state socialism which should not be confused with state 
socialism communist or socialist style. His motivation was to preserve the monarchy and 
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Therefore, what makes Wagner’s contribution to economics influential and important until 
today is that he was the first economist who postulated an active intervention of the 
government in the economy well before Keynes. However, in difference to Keynes, Wagner 
did not demand state intervention in order to stabilise the economy but to stabilise the 
political system. Although for different reasons, both Wagner and Keynes would increase 
government spending. As a result, Wagner can be seen as a predecessor of Keynes.  
However, Wagner concluded from the events in Germany (especially after the 1848 
revolutionary upheaval) that as an economy develops, social pressure increases for more 
social considerations by the state and the industry. He observed and predicted an 
overproportional increase of government spending at least for the purpose of the welfare 
state. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), Wagner distinguished three main 
reasons why government expenditure should increase: first, there is a socio-political reason 
because of an increase in state functions over time, for example for retirement, insurance, 
and natural disaster aid. The second reason is of economic nature, for example an increase 
of state assignments into science and technology and thirdly, historical, for example serving 
previously accumulated debt.  
For all these reasons Wagner (1883) predicted that economic growth would be accompanied 
by a relative large growth of government spending. A modern formulation of Wagner’s 
“law”, mentioned by Bird (1971) might run as follows: as per capita income rises in 
industrializing nations, their public sectors will grow in relative importance. Thus, the 
causality according to Wagner’s law is running from economic growth to government 
spending. 
Over the years, the relationship between economic growth and government spending has 
attracted the interest of many economists (e.g. Henrekson 1993, Bohl 1996, Sideris 2007, 
Paparas et al. 2015a, Paparas et al. 2015b, Paparas and Richter 2018, Richter and Paparas 
2013), as most of the developed (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland) and 
developing countries (e.g. Chile, Bolivia, Philippines, and Morocco) saw the size of the 
public sector increasing. 
As mentioned above, both Keynes and Wagner believe that there will be an in increase 
government expenditure under certain circumstances. For an empirical test it matters 
whether one is looking at the motivation of an action or the outcome of an action. The 
motivation for increasing government spending according to Wagner is to react to increased 
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political pressure expressed in higher welfare which is indicated by a higher growth rate. So 
higher government expenditures are caused by a higher growth rate.  
In the case of Keynes, an increased government spending may be caused by a recession in 
order to stabilise the economy. What this implies is that in government expenditure would 
react in the opposite direction as GDP growth is acting, i.e. in times of high economic 
growth, government expnediture should be low and vice versa. In Wagner’s case we would 
expect government expenditure to be positively correlated with GDP growth. In the 
Keynesian case we would expect it to be negatively correlated. 
However, one can also look at the outcome of an action. In Wagner’s case, the result of an 
increased GDP growth would be increased government expenditure. In the Keynesian case, 
an increase in government expenditure would lead to an increased GDP growth (and vice 
versa). Here, the causality for Wagner and Keynes is just the opposite.  
In this paper, we test Wagner’s law in different versions (see below), but we also include a 
test in terms of causality as described above. What we are testing therefore is whether 
government expenditure has been driven by GDP growth or GDP growth was driven by 
government expenditure, the latter can be considered as very simple Keynesian hypothesis. 
So we test Wagner vs. Keynes although as mentioned above, Wagner and Keynes are not 
necessarily exclusive to each other. In fact they can overlap each other in terms of motivation 
for government spending. Given the recent Eurocrisis, the question of what drives 
government expenditures and economic growth has become more actual than ever and it is 
not surprising, that Wagner’s Law is more widely discussed5.  
Our sample starts in 1850 and ends in 2010. During this period the UK was a country in the 
process of industrialisation, urbanisation. The country experienced increased economic 
growth, expanded government spending and increased population. Given that Keynes 
published his work only some 80 years later, one could assume that at least for the beginning 
of the sample Wagner’s Law could hold. However, after the 1930s one could assume that 
the Keynesian hypothesis is more improtant than Wagner’s Law. So we will also search for 
structural breaks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some of the 
most important characteristics of previous studies examined the Wagner’s Law. In section 
3 we describe our data and explain our methodology. Section 4 discuses the empirical results 
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(including stationarity, cointegration and structural breaks). Additionally, we include the 
results of the causality analysis. In section 5 we provide some conclusions, policy 
implications and suggestions for further research. 
2	Review	of	different	versions	of	Wagner’s	Law	
Wagner suggested that the development of government spending will take place because of 
industrialisation, social process and increasing incomes. He also recognised that this 
spending expansion has an upper limit and mentioned the important of economic regulation. 
However, he did not provide any mathematical formulation in order to examine his 
hypothesis. During the last 50 years there are available in the literature 6 different versions 
of Wagner’s law: Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Gupta (1967), Goffman (1968), Pryor 
(1969), Musgrave (1969), Goffman and Mahar (1971)  and Mann (1980). 
1. Peacock-Wiseman version 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961) version is the first modern attempt of examining the Wagner’s 
Law. The main point of their study was the rejection of the original Wagner’s theory about 
the organic theory of the state and the mechanisms of the state expansion. They claimed that 
“Wagner’s law is simply a collar of an outmoded and repugnant political philosophy and 
rests on Wagner’s own very special view of the nature of the state as a political entity” 
(Peacock & Wiseman, 1961, pp. 18). 
	 										                                                                                                         (1)  
where LG is the log of real government expenditures, and LY is the log of real GDP.  
In the Peacock-Wiseman version, Wagner’s Law has been specified as the link between 
national income and government spending.  
In their paper, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) noted that Wagner ignored wars, which led to 
massive increases in government spending. As a result, government spending would 
increase stepwise in line with major events. This is the so called “displacement hypothesis”. 
Finally, they argued that a possible increase of public spending is limited by the revenues 
and that rates are fixed by socio-political forces and factors which can be increased by a 
serious crisis. They also implemented the concept of the “tolerable burden of taxation” in 
order to explain the displacement hypothesis. 
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Interestingly, as it stands, eq(1) can neither test for the displacement hypothesis nor for the 
tolerable tax burden.  
Moreover, it is questionable whether government expenditure as a whole reflect the rationale 
of Wagner Law. One outcome of the 1848 turmoil was that the government increased 
welfare spending in order to appease the dissatisfied workers. Therefore, instead of 
government expenditure, eq(1) should have looked at welfare expenditures. 
Despite all these flaws, in our empirical analysis we will not change eq(1). We will test it as 
it is bearing in mind the above limitations as this is one version used in the literature to test 
for Wagner’s Law. 
Bird (1971) tested Wagner’s Law using eq(1) for the period 1933-1965 in Canada and found 
strong support for the law. He used cross-section data and measured the size of government 
by government expenditure plus transfers at current prices. At his exposition of the law he 
had as a dependent variable the total expenditure of central and local government and as an 
independent variables he had administration, defence, debt, environmental service, good and 
services and finally transfers.  
 
 Thornton (1999) deployed data from the 19th century (from 1850- 1913) and found 
supporting evidence for the “law” for six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom). In his testing procedure he followed three steps and 
applied the Peacock-Wiseman version. In the first step he examined the stationarity 
properties to determine the order of integration of the series using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (1979), secondly he used Johansen (1988) maximal likehood methodology and Engle-
Granger (1987) residual based approach to test for integration of the series. Finally, in the 
third step he carried out Granger (1969) causality test augmented with error correction term. 
 
Thorn (1972) examined the case of 52 countries and did not find evidence against Wagner’s 
law. Courakis et al. (1993) tested Greece and Portugal, and found that the law does not hold. 
Kolluri et al. (2000) found support in G7 countries; Oxley (1994) found support in the U.K. 
Other studies using this formulation are: Bairam (1992) and Bird (1971). 
2. Peacock‐Wiseman share version (Mann version)     
	 										                                                                                                        (2) 
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where L(G/Y) is the log of the share of government spending in total output and LY is the 
log of real GDP as above. 
Oxley (1994) used this formulation and found supportive evidence for Wagner’s law in the 
United Kingdom. The main difference to eq(1) is that the left hand side of (2) is that it uses 
the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. Oviously, eq(2) is emphasising the share of 
government expenditure in an economy. This is quite a different interpretation of 
Wagner’s Law as outlined above. Here, the argument is that with an increase of GDP, the 
government expenditure needs to grow overproportionally to GDP. This version implies an 
ever-growing state sector for as long as the economy is growing. If this hypothesis was 
true then the economy would eventually end up as a state-run economy, which is not what 
Wagner had in mind. Yet, this version of Wagner’s Law is widely used and  Kolluri et al. 
(1989) found support in 6 countries. 
3. Musgrave version       
   / 	 	⁄ 								                                                                                      (3)       
where  L(G/Y) is the log of the share of government spending in total output and L(Y/P) is 
the log of real GDP per capita. 
In this version of Wagner’s Law, the state sector only grows if per capita income grows. The 
intuition of this version of Wagner’s Law seems to be counterintuitive. It states that as people 
of an economy are better off, they demand higher government spending. But why would 
they ask to government to spend more when their circumstances improve? What Wagner 
had in mind coming from the upheaval in 1848 was precisely that the increase in wealth was 
not shared across the population and therefore the government should step in with increased 
welfare expenditure. However, Musgrave was looking for an indicator for government 
expenditure to increase. As in eq(2) a problem with this formulation is that government 
expenditure grows for as long as per capita income is growing. Likewise, according to eq(3), 
if per capita income is shrinking so should be the share of government expenditure. It is 
questionable whether this is in the spirit of Wagner’s Law.   
 
The formulation of Musgrave was adapted by Islam (2001). He tested the validity of 
Wagner’s hypothesis for the USA and employed annual time series data for the period 1929-
1996. He applied advanced econometric techniques (Johansen and Juselious (1990) 
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approach and exogeneity tests, and found strong evidence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between per capita real income and the size of the government. 
 
On the other hand, Payne (1997) tested the sustainability of the G7 countries (Germany, 
France, Japan, Canada, Italy, the UK and the USA) during the period 1949-1994. They used 
cointegration tests between government revenues and spending, and found that fiscal policy 
is sustainable only for Germany.  The budget deficit for France, Japan and Italy may have 
not been sustainable because there is no cointegration between government spending and 
revenues. Finally, the fiscal policy of the U.K., Canada, Italy and the USA may not have 
been sustainable since, even if there is coinetgration between spending and revenues, the 
estimated coefficients shows that government spending is increasing faster than revenues. 
 
Finally, Abizadeh and Gray (1985) who found mixed results in 53 countries, Bohl (1996) 
who tested the G7 countries and also found mixed results, Lin (1995) who found supportive 
evidence for the validity of Wagner’s law in Mexico, and Murthy (1993) who found support 
in Mexico. There are other scholars who used this formulation: Lall (1969), Ahsan et al. 
(1996) and Halicioglu (2003). 
4. Gupta version          	
Gupta (1967) was not convinced about Peacock and Wiseman’s argument. He argued that 
“according to them [Peacock and Wiseman, 1961], people’s ideas about the tolerable burden 
can be separated from their notions of the desirable level of public expenditure, and there is 
likely to be a gap between the two sorts of ideas because the choices made through the 
political process are inherently different from those made through markets...thus a shift in 
people’s ideas about the tolerable burden of taxation due to a special upheaval may give rise 
to a shift in the level of public expenditure with relation to national output” (Gupta, 1967, 
pp. 427). However, they imply that when a shift is associated with a depression, people get 
accustomed to a higher burden of taxation, because during a depression the taxes are 
reduced. As a result, he suggested a different model to test for Wagner’s Law.            
    / 	⁄ 								                                                                            (4) 
where L(G/P) is the log of per capita real government expenditure and L(Y/P) is the log of 
real GDP per capita.The Gupta version of Wagner’s Law follows Musgrave’s version in that 
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it uses income per capita as as the indicator for economic welfare. The difference lies in the 
government expenditure side. Eq(4) states that it is not government’s share of the economy 
that has to change but the government’s expenditure per capita. If one accepts that income 
per capita is a sufficient indicator for economic wealth then the per capita government 
expenditure has to increase. But eq(4) only follows the rationale of Wagner’s Law if the left-
hand side of eq(4) is interpreted as the share of expenditure that the “average” person 
receives from the state. However, as the average income is calculated using all incomes in 
an economy, the right hand side of eq(4) does not exclude high income earners. As a result, 
if average income increases due to higher incomes of the high income earners, then this 
would imply a higher demand for government service. Question is why high income earners 
would demand more government support? Therefore eq(4) does not distinguish between 
those income classes which actually demand more government services and those which do 
not. 
 
Again, this was not really in the spirit of Wagner given the 1848 revolutionary attempt.    
Regardless, Henrekson (1993) deployed Gupta version and investigated Wagner’s law for 
Sweden for the period of 1861-1990 and concluded that “in a test of Swedish data we cannot 
find any long-run positive relationship between the two variables and we judge it to be 
probable that this finding carries over to other countries as well” (Henrekson, 1993, pp. 413). 
He implied that studies such as Mann (1980), Ganti and Kolluri (1979), Abizadeh and Gray 
(1985), Wagner and Weber (1977) and Ram (1987) which found strong empirical support to 
Wagner’s “law”, suffer from various methodological shortcoming and consequently, and 
their results are questionable.  
 
Al-Faris (2002) used a dynamic model to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
public spending and economic growth for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
(Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar) by 
using annual data for the period 1970-1997. He applied Unit root tests test, Johansen 
procedure and Granger causality test. He did not find any supporting evidence of Keynesian 
hypothesis or Wagner’s law. He found that national income is a predictive factor of the 
growing role of government, as suggested by Wagner. Finally, his empirical investigations 
do not support the hypothesis of public spending causing national income as proposed by 
the Keynesian theory. 
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Ansari et al. (1997) tested three African countries (Ghana, Kenya and South Africa) and 
found that the hypothesis of public expenditure causing national income is not supported. 
They used time-series data for Ghana (1963- 88), Kenya (1964- 89) and South Africa (1957- 
90), and provide empirical evidence on causality results achieved by Granger (1969) and 
Holmes and Hutton (1990)  testing procedures. 
Finally, Nomura (1995) examined the displacement effect for the two oil crises in Japan, and 
then tested the validity of Wagner’s “law” during the period 1960-1991(time-series data). 
He employed simultaneous estimation of multiple structural changes in the switching 
regression model and his results were mixed as the law was supported only for some periods. 
5. Goffman version                
              	 	⁄ 	 								                                                                                    (5) 
where LG is the log of real government expenditures and LY/P is the log of per capita 
income. Eq(5) is very close to eq(1). The only difference is that it uses per capita income 
instead of total income. Therefore, what has been said with regards to the Peacock-Wiseman 
version is valid for the Goffman version as well. 
 
Dritsakis and Adamopoulos (2004) applied the Goffman version and examined the tendency 
of the Greek public sector as well as the existing correlation between the extent of 
government spending and economic growth, during the period of 1960-2001. They made an 
attempt to establish causal relationships between spending and economic development 
through the use of Wagner’s theory, by implementing cointegration approaches and Granger 
causality test. Their empirical results support Wagner’s Law because the estimated elasticity 
of consumption for total and partial public spending was consistent with the limitations of 
Wagner’s Law. Finally, they concluded that Granger-causality tests on Wagner’s Law and 
in the Keynesian model provided evidence supporting the complexity of the underlying 
interactions with most of the relationships being bi-directional in the causality models. 
Biswal et al. (1999) made an attempt to test Wagner’s and Keynesian hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between national income and total government spending in 
Canada during the period 1950-1995. They used the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step 
cointegration, error correction procedures and Granger (1969) causality procedures. They 
stated that “The results of this study support both the hypotheses when tested with broader 
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aggregate expenditure data, i.e. total government current expenditure (CE) and total current 
expenditures on goods and services (CEGS). Although the results of this study do not 
support the existence of any long-run relationship between GDP and the disaggregated 
public expenditure variables, they do support the existence of short-run causation implying 
that national income may be causing or caused by a component of the total government 
current expenditure in the short run” (Biswal, Dhawan & Lee, 1999, pp. 1283). Thus, they 
found support of both hypotheses. 
Many other economists used this version of Wagner’s law. For instance, Wagner and Weber 
(1977) tested 34 countries and found no support of the law, Nagarajan and Spears (1990) 
examined the case of Mexico and found support, Lin (1995) also tested the case of Mexico 
and found supportive evidence. 
6. Pryor version 
											 = 	 										                                                                                               (6) 
where LGC is the log of real government consumption expenditure and LY is the log of real 
GDP. The Pryor version of Wagner’s Law distinguishes between overall government 
expenditure and consumption expenditure. Therefore consumption expenditure is a closer 
indicator to welfare expenditure than overall expenditure. But depending on the definition 
of consumption  expenditure, this indicator may include still more than just welfare 
expenditure. Having said that, one reason why Pryor may have chosen consumption 
expenditure may be that data for welfare expenditure may not have been available. Pryor 
examined both developed and under-developed countries in order to show that both of them 
do not support the Wagner hypothesis. Several other studies used this formulation. Abizadeh 
and Yousefi (1988) tested the USA and found support. 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1995) tested the validity of the “law” for Greece for the 
period 1951-1992. They used the MLM (Maximum Likelihood Method), the real total 
government expenditure as a dependent variable, while as independent he sets the following 
variables: real consumption expenditure real GDP, ratio of real GDP to population, ratio of 
real government expenditure to GDP, ratio of real government expenditure to population. 
They found that there is no supporting evidence of the law during the tested period. 
7. Time Series Based Results 
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Iyare and Lorde (2004) used six versions of the “law” and found strong support for nine 
Caribbean countries using aggregate annual time-series data.  Firstly, they tested the 
stationarity properties of the data and the order of integration. Secondly, they used the two 
step Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration and error correction procedures and the 
Granger (1969) causality procedure are utilized in an attempt to uncover if a long run 
equilibrium relationship exists between income and government expenditure, and if not, 
whether there is short-run causal relationship between the two variables. 
 
There is a strand in literature examined the validity of Wagner’s and Keynesian hypothesis 
jointly (e.g. Liu et al. 2008, Katrakilidis and Tsaliki 2009, Samudran et al. 2009). However, 
there is no common pattern in the empirical results. Albatel (2002) investigated the 
relationship between spending and economic growth in Saudi Arabia during 1964-1995 by 
using cointegration approaches and Granger causality tests. His results indicate support of 
Wagner’s Law and Keynesian hypothesis. Hence, he suggested that the country has to 
reduce the government size to an optimal size by adopting a policy of privatization in order 
to cut the spending and the budget deficits. 
 
More specific to the U.K. Gyles (1991), Georgakopoulos et al. (1992), Oxley (1994), 
Thorton (1999), Chow et al. (2002), Chang (2002), Chang et al. (2004), Loizides and 
Vamvoukas (2005) and Yuk (2005) supported the validity of Wagner’s law in U.K apart 
from Yuk (2005). Yuk (2005) found mixed evidence across different periods (only in 
between 1830 and 1867 Wagner’s Law is not valid). Georgakopoulos et al. (1992) developed 
a dynamic model of government behaviour for the U.K in order to examine the Wagner’s 
law during the period of 1954-1983. They found a strong positive relationship between 
growth of real per capita income and the rise of public sector, which supports the Wagner’s 
law for U.K during the tested period. 
Loizides and Vamvoukas (2005) analysed annual data for the period 1960-1995 in order to 
examine the relationship between government size and economic growth for three European 
countries (Greece, U.K. and Ireland). They used bivariate and trivariate (by adding inflation 
or unemployment rates separately) systems which based on cointegration analysis, Error 
Correction Model strategy and Granger causality tests. They found empirical evidence that 
the increase on government spending causes the economic growth in the short run for all the 
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tested countries, while there is evidence in long run only for U.K. and Ireland. Moreover, 
they found that causality runs from economic growth to government spending in Greece and 
in U.K. (when inflation is included). 
After World War II may countries extended or built the welfare state. This was independent 
from their experienced industrialisation, urbanisation and increased demand for public 
services, which happened 50-60 years before the end of World War II. Thus, one might 
expect the relationship between income and government spending to be weaker so that 
Wagner’s Law would not hold. Yet, quite a few studies analysed developed countries, such 
as the U.K (e.g. Gyles 1991, Chow et al. 2002, Islam 2001), and found evidence in support 
of Wagner’s Law for the period after World War II.  
According to Verbeek (2000) any model that includes government spending or any measure 
in levels of government spending on the left hand side of the equation, could suffer from 
endogenous regressor problems. A solution to this problem could be the introduction of 
lagged variables as instrumental variable in the two stage least square model (Greene, 2003, 
pp. 74). 
Lately, however, many reserachers have investigated the relationship between public 
spending and national income during business cycles. In advanced economies, government 
expenditure has been found to be countercyclical (Alesina et al. 2008) or procyclical or 
unrelated to business cycles (Talvi and Végh 2005). A small number of studies examined 
for asymmetries in accordance with the displacement and ratchet effect, concluded that 
expenditures increases more during expansions than it decreases during contractions (Gavin 
and Perotti 1997; Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004). Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), 
deployed a panel of advanced countries and found support for the Buchanan-Wagner 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, they highlighted that asymmetries only have a short-term effect 
on public spending. 
3	Data	
During the period 1870-1900 U.K. had a comparative economic advantage to other 
economies such as U.S.A. and Germany, moreover their industrial output followed an 
upward trend. However, at the beginning of the 20th century these countries developed their 
own industries. During the World War I there were reported significant losses in U.K. 
economy, and things were worst after the great depression during 30s (high unemployment). 
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In figure 1 are illustrated the real government spending and real GDP. Annual data on real 
government expenditure, real GDP, population are obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and by Maddison (2001) dataset. 
 
Before World War I public spending were 15% of GDP, while at the end of this was it was 
accounted for almost 25% and remained stable for more than ten years. Government 
spending increased after the World War II at about 35% (probably because of the spending 
on infrastructure) and stabilised again since 1950. At 1960, spending followed an upward 
trend and accounted for 45% in 1980. During 1980s there was reported a decrease of almost 
10% in public spending. In 2000 public spending were 35% of GDP, while is expected next 
year to rise to 45%. Since 1900 GDP per capita at constant market prices rose by an 
estimated 300%, however GDP has not increased steadily during this period. There are 
periods that GDP declined, especially during the Great Depression during 30s, during the 
World Wars, during 1918-21, during 1991-1992. The average annual increase during this 
period was about 1,5% . 
The population in U.K. has been increased during the last 150 years but at a declining rate. 
However, the predictions for the next years suggest that will continue to increase at about 
62.250.000 at 2020. One reason for the increased population is the increased life expectancy 
and because of immigration. At the beginning of this century U.K. was an exporter of 
population, however, during the last decades many immigrants came in U.K. especially for 
E.U. and U.K. colonies.  
Figure 1: LGDP and LG in U.K. during 1850‐2010 










We apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller (1969) and the Phillips Perron (1988) unit root tests 
and examine the null hypothesis that there is a unit root and series are non-stationary. In 
Table 1 we have the results of these tests conducted with intercept on the log values of the 
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hypothesis and all series are integrated of order 1 (I(1)). In table 2 we obtain the same results, 















LG(4**)   0.45  0.98 ΔLG(3)  -8.74*  0.00 ‐2.87 LG(15***) 0.72 0.99 ΔLG(20)  ‐11.8* 0.00 ‐2.87
LGDP(0)   3.07  1.0 ΔLGDP(1)  -8.70*  0.00 ‐2.87  LGDP(4)  2.56  1.00  ΔLGDP(5)  ‐11.19*  0.00  ‐2.87 
L(G/GDP)(0)  -2.6  0.07 ΔL(G/GDP)(3)  -8.78*  0.00 ‐2.87  L(G/GDP)(13)  -2.29  0.17 ΔL(G/GDP)(23)  -16.11*  0.00 ‐2.87 
L(G/P)(4)   0.51  0.98 ΔL(G/P)(3)  -8.70*  0.00 ‐2.87 L(G/P)(15)  0.76  0.99 ΔL(G/P)(20)  -11.7*  0.00 ‐2.87
L(GDP/P)(0)   3.26  1.0 ΔL(GDP/P)(1)  -6.26*  0.00 ‐2.87 L(GDP/P)(5) 2.62 1.00 ΔL(GDP/P)(6)  ‐11.34* 0.00 ‐2.87
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. .** parentheses in ADF indicate the lag length based on 

















LG(4**)  -2.14 0.51 ΔLG(7)  -6.26* 0.00 ‐3.43 LG(10**) ‐2.37 0.39 ΔLG(21)  ‐12.40* 0.00 ‐3.43
LGDP(0)  -0.79 0.96 ΔLGDP(0)  -11.56* 0.00 ‐3.43  LGDP(4)  ‐0.88  0.94  ΔLGDP(5)  ‐11.66*  0.00  ‐3.43 
L(G/GDP)(4)  -2.69 0.25 ΔL(G/GDP)(3)  -8.77* 0.00 ‐3.43  L(G/GDP)(9)  -2.84 0.54 ΔL(G/GDP)(23)  -16.24* 0.00 ‐3.43 
L(G/P)(4)  -2.03 0.57 ΔL(G/P)(3)  -6.25* 0.00 ‐3.43  L(G/P)(11)  -2.22 0.47 ΔL(G/P)(21)  -12.38* 0.00 ‐3.43 
L(GDP/P)(0)  -0.76 0.96 ΔL(GDP/P)(1)  -6.91* 0.00 ‐3.43 L(GDP/P)(4) ‐0.84 0.95 ΔL(GDP/P)(3)  ‐11.58* 0.00 ‐3.43
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. .** parentheses in ADF indicate the lag length based on 
SIC.***Parentheses in PP indicate the Bandwith,  Newey-West using Barlett  kernel 
Engle	and	Granger	test	
One cointegration technique is the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step approach, which based in 
the idea that there is no cointegration between the variables.  However, we reject the null 
hypothesis (see table 3) in all the tested versions and we obtain the following income 
elasticities:  











=1.188,  	 	 	⁄
	⁄
=1.27 
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We are testing if the residuals		    have a unit root, by performing a 
unit root test (ADF).  The results reported in Table 11 indicate that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is unit root in 5% critical value for the tested period. Since the 
computed t value for the first period is much higher than the critical value, our conclusion 
is that the residuals from the equation ( 	 	 	are stationary. According 
to Gujarati (2003), hence the equation ( 	 	 ) is a cointegrating 
regression and this regression is not spurious. Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis for 
the tested period, so  is stationary and there is evidence of long run relationship between 





Peacock Version  Coefficient  t‐stat  Std.Error     Mann Version  Coefficient  t‐stat  Std.Error 
LGDP  1.177  74.01 0.0000 LGDP 0.177  11.16 0.0000
C  ‐1.830  ‐33.63  0.0000  C  ‐1.830  ‐33.63  0.0000 
        
N  161  N  161 
R‐squared  0.97  R‐squared 0.43 









           
Musgrave Version  Coefficient  t‐stat  Std.Error     Gupta Version  Coefficient  t‐stat  Std.Error 
LGDP/P  0.188  10.56 0.0000 LGDP 1.188  66.73 0.0000
C  0.156           1.02 0.3051 C 0.156  1.02 0.3051
        
N  161  N  161 
R‐squared  0.41  R‐squared 0.96 
Adjusted R‐squared  0.40  Adjusted R‐squared 0.96 
Durbin‐Watson  0.28  Durbin‐Watson 0.28 
F‐stat  111     F‐stat  4453 
        
Goffman Version  Coefficient  t‐stat  Std.Error 
LNGDP/P  1.27  62.04 0.0000
C  11.61  65.72 0.0000
     














The empirical results of this approach are in accordance with the theory, the calculated b of 
the Mann version is equal with the b of the Peacock version minus 1 (1.177-1=0.177) and 
the coefficient of Musgrave is equal with the coefficient of Gupta minus 1 (1.188-1=0.188). 
Finally, the income elasticity of Goffman is more than one (1.27). 
Table 4: Unit root tests in residuals (Engle‐Granger 2nd step) 
Peacock Version        Mann Version    
t‐statistic  ‐3.55* (0.00)  t‐statistic ‐3.55* (0.0077)
t‐critical  ‐2,87  t‐critical  ‐2,87 
Conclusion  Stationary     Conclusion  Stationary 
Musgrave Version        Gupta Version    
t‐statistic  ‐3.48* (0.0096)  t‐statistic ‐3.48 *(0.0096)
t‐critical  ‐2,87  t‐critical  ‐2,87 









We found evidence from ADF and PP tests that all the series are integrated of order one 
(I(1)). Firstly, will have five two dimensional VARs for the 5 versions. In order to determine 
the optimal number of lags in the 5 VARs, which is very important ensure that the residuals 
are uncorrelated and homoskedastic across time. We use several selection criteria1, with 
each test performed at the five percent significance level. The criteria indicate that the 
optimal number of lags are 5 for Peacock and Goffman versions, 1 lag for Musgrave and 
Gupta versions and 8 for Mann version. Moreover we include one dummy variable2 
(DummyAll) in order to account for specific structural breaks (1869, 1917, 1933, 1947) in 
18 | P a g e  
 
the British economy during the tested period. In all the estimated models the dummy is kept 
in the respective VARs as they turned out to be significant, whereas its absence will mean 
non normal residuals for the relevant VARs. Finally, VARs satisfy all the statistical 
assumptions required for the Johansen (1988, 1990) approach and we can apply the 
cointegration analysis. In table 3 are reported the diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity and 




Peacock Version  F(22,136)= 1.12  2,03  LM‐STAT  Critical (Chi‐sq)(df=9) 
Goffman Version  F(22,136)=0.72  2,03  Peacock Version  5.51  16.91 
Musgrave Version  F(22,136)=1.96  2,03 Goffman Version 7.58  16,91
Gupta Version  F(22,136)=1.96  2,03 Musgrave Version 2.85  16,91
Mann Version  F(22,136)=1.83  2,03  Gupta Version  2.85  16,91 






Since all the variables are I(1) we can apply the Johansen cointegration technique for 
examining if government spending and national income are related in the long run. We are 
examining 5 versions of the law3 and found that our variables are co-integrated (Table 6, 7, 




Hypothesized  Trace  0.05 Hypothesized Max‐Eigen  0.05







r=0   0.251979   60.51292*   29.79707   0.0000  r=0   0.251979   45.29067*   21.13162   0.0000 
r=1   0.076633   15.22225   15.49471   0.0549  r=1   0.076633   12.43759   14.26460   0.0953 





Hypothesized  Trace  0.05  Hypothesized  Max‐Eigen  0.05 
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r=0   0.237883   57.17613*   29.79707   0.0000  r=0   0.237883   42.37813*   21.13162   0.0000 
r=1   0.082697   14.79799   15.49471   0.0635  r=1   0.082697   13.46544   14.26460   0.0666 








Trace  0.05  Hypothesized  Max‐Eigen  0.05 







r=0   0.380118   101.9153*  29.79707 0.0000 r=0 0.380118  75.55982*   21.13162 0.0000
r=1   0.136226   26.35543*  15.49471 0.0008 r=1 0.136226  23.13823*   14.26460 0.0016





Hypothesized  Trace  0.05 Hypothesized Max‐Eigen  0.05







r=0   0.249101   60.66023*  29.79707 0.0000 r=0 0.249101  44.69148*   21.13162 0.0000
r=1   0.084547   15.96876*   15.49471   0.0424  r=1   0.084547   13.78043   14.26460   0.0595 





Hypothesized  Trace  0.05  Hypothesized  Max‐Eigen  0.05 







r=0   0.251979   60.51292*   29.79707   0.0000  r=0   0.251979   45.29067*   21.13162   0.0000 
r=1   0.076633   15.22225   15.49471   0.0549  r=1   0.076633   12.43759   14.26460   0.0953 
r=2   0.017692   2.784660  3.841466 0.0952 r=2 0.017692  2.784660   3.841466 0.0952
       
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon‐Haug‐Michelis (1999) p‐values. 
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Moreover, we calculate the income elasticities (Table 11) in order to investigate the validity 
of Wagner’s law. All the calculated elasticities are in accordance with the theory and we can 
state that according to Johansen technique Wagner’s law is valid in U.K. during the tested 
period. 
Table 11: Calculated income elasticities from Johansen approach 










Gupta version  L(G/GDP)  L(GDP/P)  St. Errors 
 
1  0.51  0.12 
Musgrave version  L(G/P) L(GDP/P) St. Errors
1  1.24 0.6




The error correction model aims to establish the short-term dynamics of a price relationship 
by calculating the time it takes for a price trend to return to the steady state after a shock 
(Wooldridge, 2013).  The speed of adjustment is calculated as the error correction term 
(ECT), and must be negative and statistically significant in order to ensure that the 
cointegration is valid.  
Since we have found evidence of a long-run relationship, we then estimate the error 
correction model (ECM), which incorporates variables both in their levels and first 
difference and captures the short-run disequilibrium situations as well as the long-run 
equilibrium adjustments between the variables. 
The short-run dynamics of the error correction model (ECM) is presented in Table 12. The 
results show that the estimated error correction term is significant at 1 percent level for all 
five examined versions of the Wagner’s law and carries a significant negative sign, 
indicating that in the UK. The government spending and gross GDP are cointegrated. It also 
shows that 17% of the deviation of the real GDP from its long-run equilibrium level is 
corrected each year in Peacock version, while other Goffman, Gupta, Musgrave and Mann 
versions indicate 10%, 15%, 18% and 18%, respectively. 
 
Table 12 : Error Correction Model 
Version   Intercept Short‐run income elasticity ECM term 












































If two variables are cointegrated, we can use the Granger causality test (1969) to check the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth in the short run. The 
Granger causality test examines whether variable Y’s current value can be explained by its 
own past value and whether the explanatory power could be improved by adding the past 
value of another variable X. If the coefficient of X is statistically significant, X is said to 
Granger cause Y. 
 
In our tests, causality is hypothesised to run from national income (GDP or GDP/P) to the 
dependent variable, which takes three different forms: G, G/P, G/GDP.  In more depth, the 
hypothesis that national income causes government spending requires that spending does 
not cause national income.  The tests applied in this section using the first differences of 
each series (i.e., the stationary values) 
We found in the previous section that there is one cointegration vector for all the models, so 
we can define the Granger causality tests as joint test (F-tests) for the significance of the 
lagged value of the assumed exogenous variable and for the significance of the error 
correction term.  We examined the 5 different versions of the law and found that the causality 
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is bi-directional, so there is support of Wagner’s and Keynesian hypotheses. The results of 





F‐stat P‐value F‐stat P‐value
Peacock 
Version 
LGDP causes LG  9.03* 0.0002 LG causes LGDP 3.18* 0.044
Goffman 
Version 
L(GDP/P) causes LG  6.41* 0.0021 LG causes L(GDP/P)  4.07* 0.018
Musgrave 
Version 
L(GDP/P) causes L(G/GDP) 5.98* 0.0031 L(G/GDP) causes L(GDP/P)  3.73* 0.026
Gupta 
Version 
L(GDP/P) causes L(G/P)  8.24* 0.0004 L(G/P) causes L(GDP/P)  3.73* 0.026
Mann 
Version 
LGDP causes L(G/GDP)  6.40* 0.0021 L(G/GDP) causes LGDP  3.18* 0.0441
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
5	Conclusion	
In this paper we investigate the validity of Wagner’s law in U.K. for the period of 1850-
2010. One of the advantages of our study is the long data that we used, which ensures the 
reliability of our empirical results. Moreover, during this period the British Economy faced 
increased economic growth, expanded public activities, included the phase of 
industrialisation and urbanisation of the economy and the increased population, all the 
assumptions of the original Wagner’s hypothesis. 
During the global financial crisis and the EMU financial crisis interest in government debt 
and government spending increased. Initially the discussion focussed on Austerity and its 
impact on economic growth. More recently, especially for the U.K., the argument focusses 
on neglected public services which are not in line with people’s expectations anymore (due 
to Austerity). This example highlights how the Keynesian argument is intertwined with 
Wagner’s hypothesis. Accordingly, in this paper we test both hypotheses simultaneously.  
We use recent econometric techniques in order to test if there is any long run relationship 
between economic growth and government spending, and also examine the direction of the 
causality between these variables. We apply unit root tests without allowing structural 
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breaks (ADF, PP) and find that all the series are integrated of order one. Secondly, we use 
the recursive Chow test, allowing for possible structural changes. Then, we deploy two 
different cointegration techniques (Johansen and Engle-Granger) to see if there is long run 
relationship between the variables. We find that there is long run relationship between them, 
thus Wagner’s law is valid according to Johansen and Engle –Granger approach. In our final 
step of our analysis, we use the Granger Causality test and find bi-directional causality 
between national income and government spending.  
These results indicate support of Wagner’s and Keynesian hypotheses. The empirical 
support of both classical hypotheses: Wagner’s law and Keynesian hypothesis, provides a 
further direction for analyzing policy issues, and exposes a fundamental understanding to 
the government or policy makers about inter-linkages between public expenditures and 
economic growth. The indication of this inter-dependency between these variables 
reproduce the effectiveness of government expenditure as fiscal instrument in stimulating 
economic growth, and the contribution of economic growth in government budget 
formulation. Our empirical results are in accordance with previous studies examined the 
case of U.K. (e.g. Gyles 1991, Georgakopoulos et al. 1992, Chow 2002), or tested the 
validity of the law for a long period(e.g. Oxley 1994, Thorton 1999, Richter and Paparas 
2013).  
These results are by no means surprising. After all, all tests include a measure of GDP and 
government expenditure. As government expenditure is part of the GDP, we are actually 
estimating a sort of identity making it difficult to identify any causal relationship. Therefore, 
it is necessary to re-think the concept of using government expenditure. We suggest to 
include for future research welfare expenditure by the government. Although, it is true that 
welfare expenditure as part of government expenditure is also included in the overall GDP 
calculation, it does not necessarily move in line with GDP. For example, welfare expenditure 
could well fall or remain constant if GDP increases. The question is whether those data are 
available which therefore constitutes a new research project.  
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